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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The State uses two methods to avoid meeting the issues
presented by this appeal.

First, it claims that the Press has

failed to preserve its claims by failing to raise the issues
below.

Even a cursory review of the transcript and pleadings,

however, reveals that all issues presented on appeal were raised
below and considered by the district court.

The State's effort

to avoid the merits on this ground is baseless.

Second, rather

than address the merits of the issues presented by the facts and
circumstances of the case under review by this Court, the State
presents new issues for the Court's consideration.

The State

apparently seeks an advisory opinion regarding whether there is a
"right of access to any documents in a civil or criminal case
once it is filed in any court," (Resp. Br. at 15, emphasis
added), or whether "there is a first amendment presumptive right
of public access extending to pretrial documents filed in
connection with the criminal warrant or subpoena issuance
processes."

(Resp. Br. at 16.)

These issues are not presented

by the facts and circumstances of the case before the Court and
are therefore not properly considered at this time.
The issues before the Court are (1) whether the Press
has a presumptive right of access, at a post-investigatory phase,
to documents filed with and/or considered by the court in
connection with a presumptively open preliminary hearing, and
(2) whether the Press has a presumptive right of access to
documents admitted into evidence during an open preliminary
hearing.

On these issues, the State presents little argument or

authority to contradict the Press's view that a presumptive right
of access should be found.

A presumptive right of access should

be extended to documents filed with and/or reviewed by a court in
connection with a preliminary hearing and evidence received
during the course of a preliminary hearing.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE PRESS HAS A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PRETRIAL
DOCUMENTS FILED AND/OR REVIEWED IN CONNECTION
WITH A PRESUMPTIVELY OPEN PRELIMINARY HEARING
A.

The Press Has A First Amendment Right Of Access To
Documents Filed And/Or Reviewed In Connection With A
Preliminary Hearing.
The State improperly characterizes the issue before

this Court at various times as whether "the public has a first
amendment right of access to any document in a civil or criminal
case once it is filed in any court," (Resp. Br. at 15), or
whether "there is a first amendment presumptive right of public
access extending to pretrial documents filed in connection with
the criminal warrant or subpoena issuance processes."
at 16.)

Neither statement of issue is correct.

(Resp. Br.

The Press does

not seek a right of access to any document once it is filed with
any court, nor does it seek access to documents filed in
connection with an ongoing criminal investigation.

Rather, the

issue before the Court is whether the Press has a presumptive
right of access, at a post-investigatory phase, to documents
filed with and/or considered by the court in connection with a
presumptively open preliminary hearing.
The defendants in this case were arrested and charged
on November 25, 1988, and were, from that point forward,
incarcerated.
1989, at 148.)

(R. 290; Transcript of Hearing, September 11,
At that point in time, the investigation with

respect to these defendants had concluded.1

At that point in

time, the probable cause statements, affidavits in support of
search warrants and subpoenas for witnesses which were then in
the court file were no longer considered by the magistrate as
part of the investigatory process but, rather, were reviewed by
the magistrate as part of the bindover determination.

It is the

court's review of court-filed documents in connection with a
presumptively open preliminary hearing that is the subject of
this appeal.
Much of the caselaw and analysis offered by the State
at pages 15 to 36 of its responsive brief focus on whether there
is a presumptive right of access to warrant materials, including
search warrants and supporting affidavits, during an ongoing
criminal investigation.

In Times-Mirror Co. v. United States.

873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989), for example, the court considered
whether the public had a qualified right of access to search
warrants and supporting affidavits relating to an investigation
which was ongoing and before any indictments had been returned.
873 F.2d at 1211.

The court held that there is no presumption of

access to such documents while a pre-indictment investigation is
ongoing.

.Id. at 1216.

This holding, however, was carefully

limited to ongoing investigations.

The court said:

"We need not

and do not decide at this time the question whether the public
1

Arguably, the State continued in its "investigation" past the point of incarceration as it deemed
necessary to solidify its case against these defendants. Clearly, however, the phase of the investigation
which may demand heightened sensitivity to protect legitimate police concerns, i.e., flight of suspects
and/or destruction of evidence, is substantially diminished if not eliminated at the point of arrest and
incarceration. Once the defendants are incarcerated and informed of the charges pending against them,
the public is entitled to a presumptive right of access to documents filed with the court and reviewed by
that court in connection with the bindover phase of the proceeding -- a phase that is presumptively open
as a matter of Utah and federal constitutional law. From that point forward, the State should be required
to meet the burden of demonstrating why the documents should remain under seal.

has a First Amendment right of access to warrant materials after
an investigation is concluded or after indictments have been
returned."

.Id. at 1218.

The other principal case relied on by the State,
Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989),
similarly limited its inquiry to the interval between execution
of the warrants and indictment.

886 F.2d at 62.

The Fourth

Circuit Court of Appeals held there was no qualified right of
access to these documents at the pre-indictment stage.

Once the

indictments were returned, however, the court unsealed the
documents.

886 F.2d at 63.

These cases are not relevant to the issue presented by
the facts of this case.

As noted above, the investigatory phase

of the criminal proceeding with respect to these defendants had
concluded.

At the time the Press first sought access to these

documents, the defendants were incarcerated and had been for over
three weeks.

The interest the State may have had in maintaining

the secrecy of these documents (e.g., to reduce the risks that
suspects or arrest warrant subjects would flee or destroy
evidence) had long since passed.

At the post-investigation

phase, the documents previously filed become relevant only to the
pending bindover proceeding, a proceeding which itself is
presumptively open.

"There is no reason to distinguish between

pretrial proceedings and the documents filed in regard to them."
Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir.
1983) (invalidating post-indictment order sealing all documents
filed with the court).

The State also offers numerous citations to Utah
statutes to support the other issue it contends is before this
Court, whether "the public has a first amendment right of access
to any document in a civil or criminal case once it is filed in
any court."

(Resp. Br. at 15.)

The State argues that there "is

no history of unrestricted public access to all court-filed
documents in Utah" (Resp. Br. at 23), and urges this as a basis
for denying the relief sought by the Press. Again, however, the
State misunderstands the issue that is presented by the facts to
this Court.

The Press does not seek access to "any document

filed in any court."

Rather, the Press seeks access to documents

filed with and/or considered by the court in connection with a
presumptively open preliminary hearing proceeding.

The "parade

of horribles" set forth at pages 21 to 24 and 32 to 35 of the
State's brief is simply irrelevant to the issue presented.
In short, none of the authorities or arguments offered
by the State is relevant to the issue presented by the facts of
this case:

whether there is a presumptive right of access to

documents filed with and/or considered by the court in connection
with presumptively open pretrial criminal proceedings.
issue, the parties appear to be in agreement.

On this

Indeed, the State

itself notes that "creating a citizenry that is informed about
its judicial process and the workings of its criminal justice
system . . . can be and risl achieved through public access to
presumptively open pretrial criminal proceedings and the

documents filed in conjunction with them,"

(Resp. Br. at 30,

empha sis added.)2
B.

The Utah Constitution Guarantees The Press A Right Of
Access To Documents Filed And/Or Reviewed In Connection With
Preliminary Hearings.
1.

The Press has preserved its claim of access under
the Utah Constitution.

The State's principal argument under the Utah
Constitution is that the Press has failed to preserve this
constitutional claim for appeal.

(Resp. Br. at 36-37.)

This

claim is simply erroneous.
In memoranda filed with the district court, the Press
expressly raised the issue of whether there is a constitutional
right of access under the Utah Constitution to documents filed
with or reviewed by the court in connection with a preliminary
hearing.

(R. 596-97.)

Following a day long evidentiary hearing

on September 7, 1989, the court heard oral argument on
September 11, 1989.

This majority of time at this hearing, which

also lasted a full day, was spent addressing whether to release
the transcript and documents received in evidence at the
2

Although no courts have addressed specifically documents reviewed in conjunction with preliminary
hearings, numerous courts have held that if the press has the right to attend a particular proceeding, it
thereby acquires the conditional right to inspect documents filed in connection with the hearing. See, e.g..
Washington Post v. Robinson. 935 F.2d 282, 287-88 (D.C Cir. 1991); United States v. Gerena, 869 F.2d
82, 85 (2d Cir. 1989); Seattle Times Co. v. U. S. Dist. Ct.. 845 F.2d 1513,1516-17 (9th Or. 1988); United
States v. Haller. 837 F.2d 84, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1988); In re New York Times Co.. 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir.
1987); In re Washington Post Co.. 807 F.2d 383, 389-90 (4th Cir. 1986); CBS. Inc. v. U.S. Dist Ct., 765
R2d 823, 825 (9th Or. 1985); Associated Press v. U.S. Dist Ct.. 705 F.2d 1143,1145 (9th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Criden. 675 F.2d 550 (3rd Cir. 1982). The State does not dispute the holdings or
application of these cases (see Resp. Br. at 24-25). It does address in some detail, however, cases holding
there is a right of access to documents filed in connection with an ongoing investigation, e&, State v.
Tallman. 537 A.2d 422 (Vt 1987) (Resp. Br. at 25), In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside
Office of Thomas Gunn. 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988) ("Gunn") (Resp. Br. at 26-30), and argues that these
cases should not be used as a starting point for holding that there is a presumptive access to documents
filed in connection with an ongoing investigation. As already noted, this case does not present the issue of
access to documents during the investigatory phase. Rather, the Tallman and Gunn cases are useful only
by analogy as an indication of the breadth of accessrightsbeing granted in courts across the country.

preliminary hearing.

At the end of the day, the parties and the

court noted that the final issue of access to the court-filed
documents had not been addressed.

Given the late hour at that

time, the parties submitted that issue on the briefs.
(Transcript of Hearing, September 11, 1989, at 157-59.)
Thereafter, when the Press submitted its proposed findings and
conclusions, it proposed a conclusion that "[t]he Press and
public have a right under ... the Utah Constitution ... of access
to ... court files."

(R. 627.) Although the court did not adopt

the Press's proposed conclusion, it was, nonetheless, before the
court.
This Court has held that a right of review on appeal is
preserved if there is some basis in the pleadings and the
proceedings for assertion of the right.

Hollev Milling Co. v.

Salt Lake & Jordan Mill & Elevator Co., 58 Utah 149, 197 P. 731,
736 (1921).

The Press's claim for a right of access under the

Utah Constitution was presented both in the pleadings and in the
proceedings before the district court.

The issue is preserved

and properly considered on review by this Court.
2.

Presumptive access should apply to documents filed
and/or reviewed in connection with a presumptively
open preliminary hearing proceeding.

As set forth in our opening memorandum, in determining
whether the Utah Constitution requires access to the pretrial
documents filed in connection with the preliminary hearing in
this case, this Court should consider whether the documents are
crucial to preserving an informed involvement in the operations
of government.

See Kearns-Tribune v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 518-22

(Utah 1984) (Court considered whether access was necessary for
7

the public to participate in the democratic process and the
effect closure would have on this process; Society of
Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1177 (Utah
1987) (Court looked to the "nature and purpose" of information or
proceeding in issue); See Appellant's Br. at 27.
The State appears to concede that this test is the
appropriate standard by which to measure the scope of the Utah
Constitution's guarantee of freedom of the press at it relates to
documents filed in connection with a preliminary hearing.
Br. at 37.)

(Resp.

The State's only argument is that this test is not

an appropriate standard by which to measure this guarantee as it
relates to "all pretrial court-filed documents," that is, all
documents of any kind "filed in any Utah court."
37.)

(Resp. Br. at

As previously noted, however, the Press does not seek an

advisory opinion as to "all pretrial court-filed documents," but
only as to those documents reviewed in connection with pretrial
preliminary hearings in criminal matters.

The State apparently

concedes that, as to that issue, the articulated standard is
appropriate and should govern access in such situations.
C.

The Press Has A Common Law Right Of Access To Documents
Filed And/Or Reviewed In Connection With Preliminary
Hearings.
1.

The State misunderstands the common law right and
its application in Utah.

The State argues that the federal court cases cited by
the Press in support of a common law right of access to documents
should not be considered because these "federal cases recognizing
a federal common law right of access" provide no precedential
authority for a conclusion that there is such a common law right
in Utah.

(Resp. Br. at 38.)

Of course, there is no federal

general common law.

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

The law applied by the federal courts when reviewing the question
of access to documents is the law of the state in which it sits
or, if there is no authority in that state, the general common
law in other states.
Cir. 1956).

Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 888 (5th

Nonetheless, the numerous federal cases and cases

from other state courts that have discussed the issue presently
pending before this Court are instructive and should be
considered.3
The State also argues that the common law right of
access is or was severely limited in scope to give access only to
those persons with a direct interest in the action.
at 39.)

(Resp. Br.

It cites for this proposition an Oregon Supreme Court

case from 1926, with several other supporting citations.

3

These

The leading federal case on the issue of access to documents is Nixon v. Warner Communications.
Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). In Nixon, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
there exists a common law right to inspect and copy judicial records and documents, including exhibits.
The case was on appeal from the District of Columbia, which derives its common law from Maryland. See
In re Parnell's Estate. 275 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.G 1967). To answer the question presented, the Court
surveyed decisions of nthe courts of this country." 435 U.S. at 597. Of the 26 cases cited, 20 are state
cases; two are from the District of Columbia; one is a U.S. Supreme Court case; and three others are
federal cases. See id- at 597-99 nn.7-9.
Of the federal cases, McCoy v. Providence Journal Co.. 190 F.2d 760, 765-66 (1st Cir. 1951), is
illustrative of the point In McCoy, a newspaper sought access to public records under both constitutional
and common law theories. The court asserted federal question jurisdiction based on a federal civil rights
statute and arising from the newspaper's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims. In deciding the
common law issue, however, the court applied Rhode Island common law and surveyed the status of the
common law in other states before granting the newspaper the right to inspect and publish the records.
Nixon is the leading federal case on the issue and federal courts faced with common law claims look
to Nixon for its precedential value. This does not change the roots of the law, however. It is a misnomer
to call the common lawrightof access a "federal common lawright,"as the State does throughout its brief.
It is also a mistake to discount federal cases that have discussed the right The number of cases and their
factual similarities to the present case argue in favor of looking to the federal cases for reasoned policy
considerations. A multitude of state cases have also recognized and discussed the common lawrightof
access, including the cases cited by the Press in its opening briet While it is certainly true that neither
state cases from other jurisdictions nor federal cases can control the decisions of this Court, they do,
however, indicate the general consensus among the states and lend reasoned support for a correct decision
in this case of first impression.

9

sources, however, do not accurately depict the scope of the
common law right.
The limited common law right advanced by the State
applied only to an individual citizen seeking access to records
for private purposes.
(1906).

See Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 319-20

It did not restrict the broader right of the general

public to inspect public records as a function of being citizens
interested in public affairs.

One court noted:

There is no question as to the common-law
right of the people at large to inspect public
documents and records. The right is based on
the interest which citizens have in the matter
to which the record relates.
«

.

.

.

. . . It is absurd to hold that a man
could inspect the public records, providing
his purpose was to use the information in some
litigation, and to deny him the right to
inspect for some other purposes that might be
equally beneficial to him. It does not
protect all of his substantial rights and has
not been received with general favor in this
country.
Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749, 750-51 (Mich. 1928)/
The vast majority of courts that have considered the
question have recognized a broader common law right of the
general public to access public records.

E.g., C^JLL—S^./ 320

A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1974); United States v. Burka, 289 A.2d 376,
378-79 (D.C. App. 1972); People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller, 181
4

Nowack explains that courts distinguished between a narrow private right and a broader public right
for procedural purposes, and not for the purpose of restricting access:
By [enunciating the narrow standard] courts did not mean that [a claimant]
had no right to inspect the books unless he wanted to use them as evidence,
but they meant that they would not issue the extraordinary writ of
mandamus to enforce a private right of inspection, unless the purpose was
to use it in some pending or prospective suit The rule adopted amounts to
a restriction on the citizen's remedy rather than on his rights.
Id. at 751.
1n

N.E.2d 376, 378 (111. App. 1962); State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens,
137 N.W.2d 470 (Wis. 1965); Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749, 75051 (Mich. 1928); Eaan v. Board of Water SUPPIV, 98 N.E. 467, 469
(N.Y. 1912);

Ex parte Drawfrauarh, 2 App.D.C. 404, 407-08 (1894);

Burton v. Tuite, 44 N.W. 282, 285 (Mich. 1889).

Indeed, the

Nixon Court noted in its survey of cases that
[i]n contrast to the English practice,
American decisions generally do not condition
enforcement of this right on a proprietary
interest in the document or upon a need for it
as evidence in a lawsuit. The interest
necessary to support the issuance of a writ
compelling access has been found, for example,
in the citizen's desire to keep a watchful eye
on the workings of public agencies, and in a
newspaper publisher's intention to publish
information concerning the operation of
government.
Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-98 (citations omitted).5

5

With these principles clear, the cases cited by the State can be understood in their proper context.
Bend Publishing Co. v. Haner, 244 P. 868 (Ore. 1926), enunciated the narrowrightin dictum-without
exploring its parameters and ramifications-before deciding the case on statutory grounds. The Oregon
court's cursory review of the common law thus missed the distinction generally agreed upon in the courts.
Mulford v. Davev, 186 P.2d 360 (Nev. 1947), repeated the narrowrightin dictum, citing State v. Grimes,
84 P. 1061 (Nev. 1906), for support. Grimes, however, recognized the distinction discussed above,
distinguishing records of general public interest (in which all have arightof access), from one man's
interest in records relating to another's property (in which the private party must show an interest).
Burton v. Reynolds, 68 N.W. 217 (Mich. 1896), recognized that Michigan case law had noted a distinction.
The cases indicated that the general public might have a broader common lawrightof access than private
individuals. See id. at 217. Finding it unnecessary to explore that broaderright,the court held that an
individual had no absolute common lawrightof access to court records for personal gain. In re Caswell
29 A. 259 (R.I. 1893), held that a newspaper's common lawrightof access to court records depends on the
newspaper having proper purposes. The court recognized that an individual must have an interest in the
records, but noted that the interest need not necessarily be private; the individual may act as a
representative of a broader common or public right
For a survey of state court decisions regarding the permissibility of public access to judicial records,
see Anno., "Public Access to State Court Records," 84 A.L.R.3d 598, 626 §§ 10(b), (d) (1978). In addition
to the cases in the sections cited by the State, the annotation cites numerous cases recognizing broader
access rights. These other holdings include an apparently unqualified view that the public has free access
to public records; that the right to access need not depend on a showing of a particular interest; and that
access may be permissible before commencement of trial See id. at 616-27. Most importantly, the
annotation points out that the narrow view advocated by the State is not necessarily conflicting with, nor

even mutually exclusive from, the broader views, several of which were enunciated by the same courts. See
id. at 626 n.2.

In short, the public's right of access to public
records is not dependent on an interest in the records for
litigation purposes.

Cases that have repeated this narrow view

have done so without examining the purported rule, often in
dictum, or have applied an earlier English procedural version.
Courts in this country have consistently distinguished this
narrow view from the general rule that the public has a
presumptive common law right of access to public records.
Finally, the State argues that ••[a]lthough actual
practice with regard to public access to some judicial documents
may have altered over the years in other American states or as a
matter of federal common law applicable to documents filed in
federal courts, neither is determinative of the common law issue
in Utah."

(Resp. Br. at 39-40.)

The State contends that there

is no reason for this Court to adopt any part of the common law
rule that has developed in federal or state courts since the time
of Utah statehood.

(Resp. Br. at 48-49.)

Again, the State

misunderstands the common law right and its application in Utah.
The Utah Code provides:
The common law of England so far as it is not
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the
constitution or laws of the United States, or
the constitution or laws of this state, and so
far only as it is consistent with and adapted
to the natural and physical conditions of this
state and the necessities of the people
hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the
rule of decision in all courts of this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1953).

The statute's plain language,

along with this Court's clear guidance on its meaning, foreclose
giving credence to the State's argument.

In Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224f 342 P.2d 94 (1959),
this Court held that when determining the common law rule to
apply in a given case, "we look to the system of common law and
equity which prevails in and has been and is now being developed
by the decisions of this country and we reject the common law of
England which is not suitable or adapted to our needs, morals or
ideals."
The rule advanced by the State fails to meet this
standard in two ways.

First, it is not the law which "prevails

in and has and is now being developed by the decisions of this
country"; and second, it is not "suitable or adapted to our
needs, morals or ideals."
The broad right of public access to public records predates Utah's statehood and continues its development to this day.
In 1879, Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J. L. 332 (Sup. Ct. 1879),
reviewed the precedents at length.
that review.

Two principles emerged from

"First, the existence of a suit was not a sine qua

non for the exercise of the right of inspection.

Second,

inspection was justified in favor of a private party for a public
right if the private party could sue to protect the public
right."

C. v. C., 320 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1974) (quoting and

discussing Ferry).

Other pre-statehood cases concurred.

E.g.,

Ex parte Drawbauoh, 2 App.D.C. 404, 407-08 (1894); Clay v.
Ballard, 87 Va. 787, 790 (1891);

Burton v. Tuite, 44 N.W. 282,

285 (Mich. 1889); State ex rel. Conran v. Williams, 96 Mo. 13, 19
(1888); Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299, 304 (1882).
Modern cases have also concurred.

"X[A]11 authorities

are agreed that at common law a person may inspect public records
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. . . or make copies or memoranda thereof.'"

People ex rel.

Gibson v. Peller, 181 N.E.2d 376, 378 (111. App. 1962) (quoting
76 C.J.S. Records § 35, at 133). Thus the original common law,
as well as that which has continued to develop, embodies a
broader right in the public in general.
Additionally, the narrow view advanced by the State is
not suitable or adaptable to the ideals and needs of the people
of Utah, as citizens of the state and of the United States.
Indeed, the State of Utah's most recent expression of the general
public policy regarding access to government records, the
Government Records Access and Management Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-2-101 (1992) ("GRAMA"), expresses the right of the public to
access such documents in constitutional terms.
§ 63-2-102(1)(a) (1992).

Utah Code Ann.

Clearly, then, the common law right of

access at issue here is not the narrow view recognized by the
English courts and largely rejected in the United States.

It is

that right expounded by the Nixon court and other courts
regularly today.

In recognizing the common law right of access,

this Court should look to the common law in its maturity.
2.

The common law right of access to pretrial
documents has not been superseded in Utah by
legislation.

The State also argues that any common law right of
public access to pretrial documents has been superseded in Utah
by legislation that comprehensively regulates the area of public
access.

However,
[t]he rule of the common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly
construed has no application to the statutes
of this state. The statutes establish the
laws of this state respecting the subjects to
which they relate, and their provisions and

all proceedings under them are to be liberally
construed with a vie# to effect the objects of
the statutes and to promote justice.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1953).

This section is mandatory, and

is required to be given full effect upon a question of first
impression.

See Hammond v. Wall, 51 Utah 464, 171 P. 148 (1918);

Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler, 44 Utah 64, 138 P. 1159
(1914).
The intent of the Utah Legislature in enacting the
statutory access provisions in force when this case arose is
clear from the language of the statutes.

The Public and Private

Writings Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-26-2 (repealed effective
April 1, 1992), stated that H[e]very citizen has a right to
inspect and take copy of any public writing of this state except
as otherwise expressly provided by statute."

The Archives and

Records Services and Information Practices Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-2-66 (repealed effective April 2, 1992), stated that the
state archivist is to keep the public records and "to make them
accessible, unless otherwise restricted by law, for convenient
use and shall permit them to be inspected, examined, abstracted,
or copied at reasonable times under his supervision by any
person."
The language of these statutes (and the newly enacted
GRAMA) does not repeal the widely recognized common law right of
access discussed above.

Rather, these statutes pronounce public

policy; they reaffirm the common law.6

The legislature, out of

abundant caution and with an unmistakable object in view, enacted
statutes to ensure that persons having an interest in public
records would have a right to inspect them.

The enactment of

statutes that are in harmony with the public policy developed at
common law does not require this Court to disregard two centuries
of helpful analysis provided by the common law.

The common law

right of access may co-exist with the statutory right.

By

explicitly recognizing a common law right of access, this Court
makes available scores of volumes of commentary and reasoned
policy to guide courts in properly deciding access questions.
The statutes then may mandate the rule and detail the procedure;
case law specifically addresses particular situations.7
The cases cited by the State are not to the contrary.
In Nixon, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a claim of
common law right of access in light of the Presidential
Recordings Act, a statute enacted specifically to deal with the
tapes at issue.

The Court recognized the common law right, as

did both parties.

The Court then balanced the interests

involved, concluding that the existence of an act passed to
6

In People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller. 181 N.R2d 376 (111. App. 1962), the court considered the right
of access to public records under common law and statutory theories. The statute involved read: "Any
person shall have the right of access to any public records of the expenditure or receipt of public funds . . .
for the purpose of obtaining copies of the same or of making photographs of the same
" 111. Rev.
Stat. U 43.7 (West 1988). The court found that this statute did not repeal the common law right Rather,
it "declares the public policy relating to public records in the State of Illinois." 181 N.E.2d at 378.
7

GRAMA, for example, provides that arrest warrants after issuance and search warrants after
execution and filing are public documents that must be disclosed except upon a showing of "good cause."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-301(2)(m&n) (1992). A myriad of cases, many of which have been cited in the
context of this appeal, have considered the issues at stake and could be brought to bear in the
interpretation of "good cause" under GRAMA In general, although common law principles in direct
conflict with GRAMA must yield to the statute, when cases arise that are not covered by GRAMA, the
common law would control.

address the specific tapes at issue weighed the scales in favor
of denying access.

The Court did not hold, as the State

purports, that the Act modified the common law right of access.
In Bend Publishing Co. v. Haner, 244 P. 868 (Ore.
1926), a newspaper sought access to court records under a state
statute.
access.

The court did not consider a common law claim to
The court did note that statutes in force enlarged the

common law right enunciated by the court to allow access by all
persons for any lawful purpose.

Similarly, in Mulford v. Davev,

186 P.2d 360 (Nev. 1947), the court determined that a common law
right of access was enlarged by statute, allowing the general
public access at all times during office hours.
This Court should find that the Press has a common law
right of access to documents reviewed in conjunction with
preliminary hearings, independent of existing statutes.
II.
THE PRESS HAS A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE IN AN OPEN PRELIMINARY HEARING
A.

The Press Has Preserved Its Claim Of Access To Documents
Admitted Into Evidence In An Open Preliminary Hearing.
The State contends that the Press has failed to

preserve for appeal any claim of a constitutional or common law
right to inspect and copy documents admitted into evidence during
an open preliminary hearing.

The State contends that the issue

of access to evidence was raised for the first time at the
January 19, 1990 hearing on objections to proposed findings and
conclusions and that previously no argument had been presented
concerning access to evidence.

(Resp. Br. at 10-12, 42-44.)

These contentions are simply erroneous.
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That the parties and the court below were cognizant of
the separate issue of access to documents received in evidence at
the preliminary hearing is clear from the memoranda filed in
connection with the proceedings below as well as the transcripts
of those proceedings.

At the September 7, 1989 hearing, for

example, the district court asked counsel for the defendants and
for the State to delineate the specific items of evidence
received at the preliminary hearing that they believed should
remain sealed.

(Transcript of Hearing, September 7, 1989, at 6.)

Mr. Peterson, counsel for the State below, and Mr. Taylor,
counsel for defendant Wood, each expressed comments reflecting
counsel's understanding that the exhibits received at the
preliminary hearing were also before the court.

(Transcript of

Hearing, September 7, 1989, at 6:22, 11:9-13, 13:11-18, 18:5-25,
19:1-5, 19:21-25, 20:1-4.)

Indeed, counsel for the Press

specified their understanding as to whether the issue of access
to evidence was under consideration:

"[W]e are asking ... to

view those items of evidence that were before a court at some
time in the process of making a decision."

(Transcript of

Hearing, September 7, 1989, at 19:9-14.)
At the hearing on September 11, 1989, counsel for all
parties again expressed their understanding that the documents
received in evidence at the preliminary hearing were under
consideration by the court.
below, said:

Ms. Geary, counsel for the State

"The way I understood it was that there were two

issues, the preliminary hearing transcript and the release of
that, and all of the documents that became part of that
preliminary hearing transcript."
IP

Seeking clarification on

Ms. Geary's statement, the court inquired:

"If anything was

offered in evidence as an exhibit, it became part of the
preliminary hearing and is sealed."
"Right."
12.)

Ms. Geary responded:

(Transcript of Hearing, September 11, 1989, at 10:5-

In fact, Ms. Geary requested that the State's argument

regarding the "preliminary hearing transcript and accompanying
exhibits" be held in chambers.

(Transcript of Hearing,

September 11, 1989, at 12:11-15.)

Finally at this hearing,

counsel for the State and the defendants again delineated for the
court those items of evidence received at the preliminary hearing
which they believed warranted being held under seal, including
the pathologist report, the autopsy report, photographs, and
statements of the defendants. (Transcript of Hearing,
September 11, 1989, at 19:10, 34:20-25, 35:1-3, 35:13-25, 36:1-3,
38:6-12, 40:14-25, 41:7-16.)
Following the September hearings, the State submitted a
Supplemental Statement in Response to Motion to Unseal Court
File.

In its opening paragraph, the State noted that the

district court had just concluded an evidentiary hearing wherein
it "received evidence, heard testimony and oral argument on the
issue of access to the preliminary hearing transcript and
exhibits received as evidence at that hearing."

(R. 633.)

On October 23, 1989, the district court issued its
Order on these matters. At that time, the court ordered that the
seal placed on the transcript of the preliminary hearing be
dissolved, but that the seal be continued as to "tangible items
of evidence including pictorial or diagrammatic exhibits received
in evidence at the preliminary hearing."
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(R. 943-44; Appellants'

Br. App. 1.)

Thereafter, the parties submitted proposed Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

In the opening paragraph of the

State's proposed findings and conclusions, the State phrased the
issue considered by the court as "whether the presumption of
openness to the preliminary hearing transcript and documents
received at that hearing in these cases was outweighed or in any
way modified by the interests of the State and/or the
defendants."

(R. 1100)

On behalf of the Press, counsel

submitted proposed findings and conclusions along with a cover
letter which specifically addressed the court's decision with
respect to the exhibits received in evidence at the preliminary
hearing.

(R. 1685-86.)

As later explained at the January 19,

1990 hearing on the proposed findings and conclusion, the purpose
of this letter was to help flush out the court's decision with
respect to the exhibits received in evidence at the preliminary
hearing.

(Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 38.) At

the January 19 hearing itself, each of the parties devoted time
to a discussion of this issue.

The State continued to advance

its position that the Press does not have a right of access to
documents received in evidence at preliminary hearings,
(Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 26:8-16, 28:6-19,
51:3-23), and the Press continued to object to this conclusion.
(Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 38:11 to 43:13.)
The portion of the January 19 hearing on which the
State basis its argument that the issue of access to evidence was
waived involves a lengthy exchange between Patrick A. Shea,
counsel for the Press below, and the court.

This colloquia

started with a discussion of two concepts —

the issue of access

to evidence admitted in preliminary hearings and the question of
the proper interpretation of the Information Practices Act.
(Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 57-58.) As part of
this general exchange, counsel and the court began discussing a
third issue —

whether the media is entitled to the same access

in the courtroom as are counsel, e.g., access behind the bar in
counsel area.
63.)

(Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 61-

It was as to this third issue of physical access of the

media to the courtroom that the court expressed concern that the
issue was not before it.

After the court expressed its concern

on this third issue, Mr. Shea returned to the previous question
relating to the release of the transcript of the preliminary
hearing but not the evidence admitted in connection with that
hearing.

(Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 63:22-25.)

The court then clarified its understanding that the issue of
access to evidence received in connection with open preliminary
hearings had been preserved for appeal.

The court said:

I think the issue is there. I really think
the issue is there, the way the ruling has
been framed. I don't think you have any —
I don't think there would be any problem in
raising that issue on appeal. I really don't,
because I've clearly said what I think you're
entitled to at that point, and what I think
the court documents provision of our law
coverfs], and they would be those exhibits,
those pictorial, things that are not
represented totally by just mere rules of
description, which you're entitled to.
(Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 64:4-15.)
In short, the record is replete with references to the
issue of access to evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing.
This issue has been preserved for appeal and is properly before
this Court.
21

B.

The Press Has A Constitutional Right Of Access To
Documents Admitted Into Evidence In An Open Preliminary
Hearing.
The State admits that the "cases cited by the media

[are] persuasive on a narrowly framed issue involving ... access
to specific evidentiary items introduced at the preliminary
hearing in this case."

(Resp. Br. at 45.)

Indeed, the State

concedes that "'[a]ccess' by the public to the information
contained in [interviews admitted into evidence at the
preliminary hearing here] may be protected by the first amendment
as part of its constitutional right to attend a preliminary
hearing."

(Resp. Br. at 46 n.20.)

It goes on to argue, however,

that the Press has no constitutional right to "inspect and copy
any exhibit received into evidence at any presumptively open
court proceeding ... at any stage of the judicial process."
(Resp. Br. at 44.)
As previously noted above, the Press does not, by this
appeal, seek an advisory opinion as to all documents of any kind
received into evidence at any proceeding.

Rather, the Press

seeks review of the issue presented by the facts and
circumstances of this case: whether there is a constitutional
right8 of access to inspect and copy exhibits received into
evidence at an open preliminary hearing.
8

The cases cited by the

As noted in our opening brief at 25-27, Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution contains
language significantly different from and substantially broader than the language appearing in the First
Amendment to the federal constitution. The inclusion of the words "abridge or restrain" rather than
merely "abridge" signals an intent that the Utah provision provide protection at least as great as that given
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See KUTV v. Conder. 668 P.2d 513 (Utah
1983). Moreover, Article 1, section 11 of the Utah Constitution contains an expansive open courts
provision, recognizing that "[a]ll courts shall be open." These sections of the Utah Constitution support a
finding of rights at least as broad as therightsrecognized under the United States Constitution on the
question of access to exhibits received in evidence during open preliminary hearings.

State have no bearing on this issue.

Instead, the State cites

cases dealing with the somewhat unique question of whether the
Press has a constitutional right to copy tapes received in
evidence.

Of the cases cited by the State, several involve the

limited situation where the press sought to make copies of tapes
for rebroadcast and sale to the public even though the press had
already been provided a complete transcript of the tapes.

E.g.,

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 594 (1978)
(discussed in Appellant's Brief at 35 n.39); Belo Broadcasting
Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Webbe, 791 F.2d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1986).

In those cases, the

courts held the press had no special right to make aural copies
where they had received a copy of the information presented at
the open proceeding.9

No such issue is presented here.

The State argues that a constitutional right of
access to exhibits should not be recognized because of the
administrative burden that would result from such a ruling.
The State contends that concerns over maintaining the physical
integrity of original documents and nondocumentary exhibits
requires that access be denied.

As previously noted in our

opening brief, the Press acknowledges that any inspection and
copying of exhibits must be done without impairing the integrity
of the evidence or interfering with the orderly conduct of the

9

Interestingly, the cases cited by the State for the proposition that there is no constitutional right
to copy tapes received in evidence each went on to hold there is a common law right to copy tapes
received in evidence, Rgy Nixon, 435 U.S. at 608; United States v. Beckham. 789 F.2d 401, 412 (6th Or.
1986); Belo, 654 R2d at 429; Webbe. 791 F.2d at 106; State ex rel. KOIN-TV, 711 P.2d 966, 974 (Ore.
1985); Valley Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark. 798 F.2d 1289,1293 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Thomas,
745 F.Supp. 499,502 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); United States v. Criden. 648 F.2d 814,823 (3d Cir. 1981).

*>%

trial•

The specific methods by which this can be accomplished

should be left to the discretion of the court given the
particular circumstances of the documents and other exhibits, and
the nature of the request.
The State also argues that access to evidence admitted
at preliminary hearings should be denied because evidence might
be admitted which may not be legally admissible at trial.

This

issue was fully considered, and rejected, by this Court in
connection with its review of access to the preliminary hearing
itself.
1984).

Kearns-Tribune v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 526-27 (Utah
Any concerns regarding potential jurors being tainted by

exposure to evidence which may be inadmissible at trial is
properly accommodated through the exercise of available
alternatives.

This is true whether the evidence to which the

jurors are exposed is received in documentary form or by witness
testimony.
The State's concerns are easily accommodated through
the tests already subscribed to by this Court.

Documents

admitted into evidence at a presumptively open preliminary
hearing should also be subject to the presumption of openness.
C.

The Press Has A Common Law Right Of Access To Documents
Admitted Into Evidence In An Open Preliminary Hearing.
The State makes the same arguments regarding a common

law right of access to documents admitted into evidence in open
preliminary hearings as it did with regard to documents filed in
conjunction with those hearings.

Specifically, the State argues

that the Court should not look to the "federal" common law to
resolve questions of access in Utah but, rather, should be
required to apply the common law that existed in the State of

Utah at the time of statehood•

The State also contends that the

common law has been obviated as a source of any access right in
Utah by virtue of statutes promulgated on the same issue.
The Press fully responded to each of these arguments in
Point 1(C), above, and, by this reference, incorporates its
response as if fully set forth herein.
CONCLUSION
When the issue before the Court is properly framed, the
appropriate result is clear:

There is no principled reason to

distinguish between access to preliminary hearings and access to
the documents which guide the decisionmaker in connection with
those hearings, whether those documents are found in the court
files or received in evidence during the hearing itself.

The

public is and should be interested in the information that
informs the courts of this State in making decisions affecting
the life and liberty of its citizens.

If the public is

adequately to scrutinize and learn from the criminal process, it
cannot be denied access to documents that play an integral role
in forming the basis of the decisions made and the issues
discussed during that process.

It is this type of access and

involvement in the process that this Court has recognized as
important in preserving our republican system.

The public's

right of access should be extended to documents filed with and/or
reviewed by a court in connection with a preliminary hearing and
evidence received during the course of a preliminary hearing.

DATED this 2nd day of October, 1992.
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